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Two experiments were conducted to examine people’s sensitivity to person infor-
mation from the morality domain (relation-oriented) and the competence domain
(task & achievement-oriented). In a lexical decision paradigm, the findings from
Experiment 1 showed that younger adults were faster to identify person cues (trait
words) from the morality than from the competence domain, especially cues that
were related to immorality. Experiment 2 compared the responses of younger and
older adults. Despite the slower responses of the older adults, the findings indicated
that all participants were faster at identifying cues from the morality domain than
from the competence domain, with no age interactions. The results from Experi-
ment 2 also suggested that disparate findings in the literature regarding reaction
times to morality/competence cues and valence (positive or negative) were a func-
tion of word frequency effects. The findings are discussed in terms of people’s
chronic concern with the moral aspects of others as invariant across the lifespan,
given that the morality domain is where interpersonal costs and threats are most
likely to be signaled.
To act in the social field requires a knowledge of social facts—of persons and groups. To
take our place with others we must perceive each other’s existence and reach a measure of
comprehension of one another’s needs, emotions, and thoughts. (Asch, 1952, p. 139)
As Asch noted, a basic, if not the central, mechanism underlying interpersonal in-
teraction is that people must come to some conclusion regarding each others’ inten-
tions, dispositions, and feelings (Asch, 1946; Heider, 1944; Jones & Gerard,1967;
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Tagiuri & Petrullo, 1958). However, it seems that when people perceive and think
about others and try to determine their intentions, numerous things would come
to mind. How is it that people, for the most part, have little trouble in solving this
potentially overwhelming cognitive task? One possibility is that people rely on
recurring themes or schemas to organize their social world. Such schemas might
be expected to help simplify the number of hypotheses people entertain about
others.
Two potential themes that people appear to use to structure and make sense
of their lives are morality and competence. Morality refers to characteristics rel-
evant to ethics and a sense of right and wrong in interpersonal relationships.
Competence refers to characteristics relevant to task accomplishment, achieve-
ment, and attainment. The distinction between morality and competence is ap-
parent in many different research domains in the psychological literature.
For example, the distinction is used to characterize the types of groups that
emerge in organizations. Some groups are more informal in nature and develop
among members of organizations in order to fulfill socioemotional or relation-
ship needs, whereas formal groups are formed in order to perform tasks and
accomplish objectives (Hamner & Organ, 1978). A similar characterization is
used to describe leadership behavior and styles (e.g., Bales, 1953; Fiedler &
Chemers, 1974; Shartle, 1956), and it could be argued that the distinction
maps onto the major demarcation in political affiliation in the modern United
States.
A discussion of morality and competence is also inherent in posited cultural
differences in self-construals, namely collectivism and individualism (Sanchez-
Burks, Nisbett, & Ybarra, 2000; Wojciszke, 1997). Collectivists are character-
ized as more interdependent and more concerned with social relations, whereas
individualists are characterized as being more concerned with achievement and
accomplishment. In a related vein, the distinction between morality and com-
petence is used to make sense of self-regulation goals, for example, relational
versus task (Bales, 1965; Benne & Sheats, 1948). The distinction is also ap-
parent in discussions concerning the functions that conflict serves, to solidify
the bonds of group members or to help bring about problem resolution (Coser,
1956).
Most relevant to the present research, the distinction between morality and
competence is also used to describe the structure of personality (e.g., Benet &
Waller, 1995). Benet and Waller have found that, in addition to the big five
personality dimensions, the two other “big” dimensions people use to under-
stand themselves are morality and competence. In terms of person perception,
it has been shown in multidimensional approaches that the morality and com-
petence dimensions account for most of the variance in people’s judgments of
others (Rosenberg, Nelson, and Vivekananthan, 1968). This characterization is
echoed in more recent person perception research dealing with dispositional
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attribution and inference (e.g., Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Skowronski & Carlston,
1987).
It thus appears that what underlies much of people’s social cognition has either
to do with morality or relationship-related issues and competence or achievement
and task-related issues. So when thinking and trying to make sense of other people,
some constraints appear to be available regarding the hypotheses people will en-
tertain and the inferences they will draw. Our focus in the present research is to
examine the possibility that one of these themes or categories of information is
primary and dominates people’s concerns about others, and whether the focus
evident in young adults is different in older adults.
IS ONE DOMAIN PRIMARY?
Even though the thoughts people are likely to entertain about others in general
will have to do with the relational aspects of others or their competence and abilities,
perceivers should be chronically concerned with one of these categories. Part of
the reason for this concern is that people should be most affected by whether or
not others pose threats or will create costs for them (cf. Peeters & Czapinski, 1990;
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). We hypothesize that potential threats and costs from
others are most likely to be signaled in the morality rather than the competence
domain.
In line with this reasoning, models of social inference propose that for the
morality domain, people hold the lay theory thatimmorality is more informa-
tive regarding a person’s dispositions than ismorality (Reeder & Brewer, 1979;
Skowronski & Carlston, 1987; Ybarra & Stephan, 1996, 1999). For example,
Reeder and Brewer suggest that people have schemata that relate different behav-
iors with underlying trait dispositions. For the morality domain, perceivers believe
that moral people tend not to do immoral things, but that immoral people can do
moral and immoral things. Thus, in the morality domain, the most informative cue
about others is negative person information.
The reverse tends to be the case in the competence domain. For this domain,
people hold the lay theory that it is unlikely that anincompetentperson will, all
of a sudden, produce a competent performance. But it is likely that acompetent
person will on occasion, for a variety of possible reasons, do incompetent things.
Therefore, the most informative cue in the competence domain is positive person
information (Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987).
It thus appears that the domain in which people will tend to glean any infor-
mation about potential threats or costs from others is the morality domain—that
is where cues signaling potential harm stand out (cf. Peeters & Czapinski, 1990).
Consequently, it should be expected that people will be particularly concerned
with others’ morality rather than others’ competence.
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THE CHRONIC CONCERNS OF YOUNGER AND OLDER ADULTS
An uncontroversial premise of the present research is that there are cogni-
tive declines as a person grows older. As people grow older, their general ability
to process information is reduced (Craik & Byrd, 1982), and they experience
declines in speed of processing and working memory (for a review see Park,
2000). Speed of processing refers to how rapidly people perform mental operations
(Salthouse, 1991, 1996), whereas working memory is the on-line processing capa-
city available to store, retrieve, and manipulate information. There is evidence that
age-related decreases in speed of processing and working memory account for age
differences in a broad range of behaviors including long-term memory tasks (Park
et al., 1996, 2000); the assembly of abstract three-dimension figures from blocks
(Morrell & Park, 1993); memory for television, radio, and print news (Frieske
& Park, 1999); and reasoning about medical decisions (Zwahr, Park, & Shifren,
1999).
Despite these general age-related declines in cognition, people’s chronic con-
cern with others’ morality is likely to be present regardless of a person’s age. It
is the case that life goals change as people get older and that older adults tend
to place less value in achievement than do younger adults (cf. Carstensen, Gross,
& Fung, 1997). However, all people regardless of their age tend to remain em-
bedded in a web of social relations (Antonucci & Akiyama, 1987; Charles &
Carstensen, 1999), although the rate of social interaction may decline in later life
(e.g., Lee & Markides, 1990). Given the continuing social nature of humans across
the life-span, it should thus be expected that all people should remain sensitive
to relationship or the morality-related aspects of others. This should be especially
true for immoral cues because immorality signals potential threats and costs. The
case for whether age differences might be found with respect to competence is
less clear. On one hand, because older adults value achievement in self less, they
might be less sensitive to competence than are young adults. On the other hand,
as one becomes older and perhaps needs to rely more on others for services,
competence may remain as salient as it did in young adulthood or could even
increase. It seems, for example, unlikely that older adults would be less con-
cerned about the competence of a surgeon or other service provider than young
adults.
The first experiment assessed young adults’ sensitivity to person infor-
mation from the morality and competence domains to examine the hypothe-
sis that people tend be more concerned with others’ morality than compe-
tence, especially cues that suggest immorality. The second experiment compared
the sensitivity of younger and older adults to these domains in addition to
addressing a methodological issue regarding word frequency effects associa-
ted with the lexical decision paradigm used to study the major theoretical
issues.
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EXPERIMENT 1
One way to investigate what concerns people most is to examine the cat-
egories of person information they tend to use when thinking about others. In
the present studies participants were asked to complete a lexical decision (LDT)
task in which they had to identify person cues (trait words) and nonword letter
strings presented on a computer monitor. In a standard LDT task participants are
asked to identify whether letter strings with which they are presented constitute
a word or a nonword, and they have to do this as quickly as possible. Thus, if a
participant was presented with the following letter string,OSTROLY, they should
respond by saying or pressing a “NO” button indicating that this is not a word.
However, if the following letter string was presented to participants,DISHONEST,
they should respond by saying or pressing a “YES” button indicating that this is a
word.
Researchers have used this method to test ideas of how the semantic relat-
edness of words that are presented prior to the letter strings affect the speed with
which people respond to the letter strings (e.g., Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971).
Thus, if the wordSCOUNDRELwere presented prior to seeingDISHONEST, par-
ticipants should respond faster in saying that dishonest is a word than if the word
FLOWERwas presented.
In the present studies, participants were not presented with any priming words
prior to the presentation of the target letter strings. Instead, it was reasoned that
people’s chronic concern with other’s morality would result in greater activation
or readiness of the morality category compared with the competence category.
Compared to words related to competence, this activation should facilitate to a




Twenty-seven young adults were recruited from introductory psychology
classes at the University of Michigan. They were given course credit for their
participation in the study. All participants had to respond to stimuli (person cues)
that were related to the domains of morality and competence. In addition, within
each domain the information included both positive and negative person cues.
Thus, the design of the study was a 2 (Person cue domain; morality, compe-
tence)× 2 (Cue valence; positive, negative) repeated measures factorial, with both
factors varying within participants. Participants were run in noninteracting groups
of 2–4.
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Materials and Procedure
Participants were recruited to take part in a study dealing with word recog-
nition. Participants were seated in front of a computer monitor and were told that
their task was to recognize as quickly as possible whether letter strings presented to
them on the computer monitor were words or nonwords. In the current experiments,
we were not interested in participants’ responses to the nonwords. The nonword
letter strings were included to reinforce the cover story for the experiment, that the
experiment dealt with word recognition.
In this experiment the major concern was with participants’ responses to per-
son cues as a function of whether they described morality or competence-related
aspects of people, and whether the person cues referred to positive or negative
aspects of people’s personalities. Eighty person cues were chosen from the lists
created by Anderson (1968), and 80 nonwords were created for the study. Forty of
the target words (person cues) were related to the morality domain and 40 words
were related to the competence domain. In addition, half of the cues (20) within
each domain were positive in valence and half were negative in valence. The
positive cues in the morality domain included, for example, “honest,” “helpful,”
“friendly,” and “gentle.” Some of the positive cues in the competence domain in-
cluded “clever,” “creative,” “skillful,” and “talented.” Some of the negative person
cues in the morality domain included “deceitful,” “hostile,” “cruel,” and “disloyal.”
And some of the negative cues in the competence domain included “stupid,” “ig-
norant,” “weak,” and “clumsy.” Examples of nonwords included “aetrivce,” “tign-
noar,” “pelhulf,” and “negetg.” Favorability ratings were obtained from norming
participants (n = 65) and were submitted to a 2 (Person cue domain; morality, com-
petence)× 2 (Cue valence; positive, negative) repeated measures ANOVA. The
analysis produced only a reliable main effect for Cue valence,F(1, 64)= 626.53,
p < .0001. This effect, as expected, indicated that positive cues (M = 5.44) were
rated more favorably than negative cues (M = 2.05).
The stimulus words (person cues) used in the study were controlled for how
frequently they occurred in the natural language. This is critical given that posi-
tively valenced words occur more frequently than negatively valenced words, and
frequency facilitates the speed with which people recognize words (e.g., Balota
& Chumbley, 1984; Schilling, Rayner, & Chumbley, 1998). We controlled for
a word’s frequency of occurrence by preselecting the items with regard to the
Kucera and Francis (1967) word norms. The mean frequencies were submitted to
a 2 (Person cue domain; morality, competence)× 2 (Cue valence; positive, nega-
tive) repeated measures ANOVA. The analysis produced no reliable main effects
(Fs< 1.00). The cues related to morality (M = 4.57 per million) occurred as
frequently as the cues related to competence (M = 4.45). In addition, the positive
cues (M = 4.52) occurred as frequently as the negative cues (M = 4.50). Finally,
the interaction of the two factors was also nonsignificant (F < 1.00), indicating
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that the frequency of occurrence was equivalent for all the cues (positive morality
cues,M = 4.60; negative morality cues,M = 4.55; positive competence cues,
M = 4.45; negative competence cues,M = 4.45).
The participants’ task was to press a key on the computer keyboard to indicate
whether the letter string presented on the computer monitor was a word and a
different key if the letter string was a nonword. Prior to the appearance of the
target string, a “+” sign appeared as a fixation point in the middle of the screen for
1 s to direct participants’ attention to where the letter string would be presented.
Then with an equal probability of occurrence, a word or nonword appeared on the
screen until participants responded that it was a word by pressing the “1” key or
a nonword by pressing the “2” key. After participants made their response, a 2-s
interval expired before the fixation point appeared on the screen and participants
continued with the next trial. Each participant received a different random order
of presentation. Before the real task, participants were presented with 20 practice
trials. The time it took participants to respond to the person cues served as the
dependent measure for the study. After responding to the items, participants were
debriefed, given course credit, and thanked for their participation.
Results
Four average response latencies were created for each participant, represent-
ing the combination of cue domain and cue valence. Wrong responses occurred at
a low rate (6%), so they were not analyzed. In addition, responses beyond 2 s were
classified as outliers and removed from the analysis. This criterion represents an av-
erage of previously used limits. Previous research has used limits of 1.5 s (Wentura,
Rothermund, & Bak, 2000) or 2.5 s (Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992).
The analysis was equivalent whether these responses were included or not.
Participants’ response latencies to the person cues were submitted to a 2
(Person cue domain; morality, competence)× 2 (Cue valence; positive, negative)
repeated measures ANOVA (see Table I for means). All three effects of the overall
analysis were significant. As anticipated, the analysis yielded a main effect for do-
main,F(1, 26)= 8.89, p < .006. Participants responded faster to morality (M =
652 ms) than to competence-related person cues (M = 688 ms). The analysis
Table I. Mean Response Times (Milliseconds) as a Function of





Note.The larger the number the longer the response time.
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also produced a main effect for valence,F(1, 26)= 4.65, p < .04. This effect
indicated that participants were faster to respond to negative (M = 656 ms) than
to positive person cues (M = 680 ms). Finally, the interaction was also reliable,
F(1, 26)= 7.89, p < .009. In general terms, this effect indicated that the differ-
ence in responding to the negative versus positive cues was larger in the morality do-
main (Mdifference= 52 ms) than in the competence domain (Mdifference= 4 ms).
With regard to the hypothesis that people would be more sensitive to negative
cues in the morality domain compared to the other cues, responses to the immorality
cues were compared to responses to the other three types of cues. In all three
comparisons, people’s responses to the immorality cues were faster than to any
other type of cue (allps< .007). People were fastest to recognize person cues that
were related to immoral dispositions.
Discussion
The findings from Experiment 1 indicated that people responded faster to
person cues from the morality than the competence domain. Further, people were
faster to respond to immorality cues than to any other type of cue. These findings
were obtained despite the fact that the person cues did not differ in word frequency
and despite the fact that the favorability of the cues was equivalent across the
morality and competence domains. These results are consistent with the idea that
people chronically attend to the morality domain to discern potential threats and
costs from others.
In the next experiment we wanted to replicate the findings from Experiment 1,
in addition to examining how older adults might be similar to or different from
younger adults in their responses to different person cues. Based on cognitive
aging research showing that older adults have decreased speed of processing and
working memory resources than younger adults (e.g., Craik & Byrd, 1982; Park
et al., 1996; Salthouse, 1996; see Park, 2000, for a review), it was anticipated that
older adults would be slower to respond to person cues in general compared with
the younger adults. Despite these general differences as a function of age, the case
was made earlier that all people should be concerned with morality monitoring,
especially information that indicates immoral tendencies in others. Older adults
should be no exception. As a result, it was expected that all participants would
respond faster to morality-related than competence-related person cues, especially
immorality cues.
In addition to investigating the sensitivity of younger and older adults to
information from the morality and competence domains, a secondary goal of Ex-
periment 2 was to reconcile the findings from Experiment 1 with recent research
by Wentura, et al. (2000, Experiment 3). These investigators also used a lexical
decision task to examine people’s responses to person cues. In their study, some
participants were asked to press a button to make their responses while other
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participants were asked to withdraw a finger from depressing a button to make
their responses. Their findings showed an interesting interaction between type of
response and the person cue to which participants responded. Of greater relevance
to the present research, these investigators found that participants were faster in
responding to positive compared with negative cues overall, inconsistent with the
present research.
One possible explanation for the discrepancy in findings is that these re-
searchers did not control for the cues’ frequency of occurrence. They reported
that the positive words they used occurred more frequently in the language than
the negative words. Thus, if word frequency had been controlled for, their results
might be more in line with ours—showing that people are faster in responding to





Twenty-six young adults were recruited from introductory psychology classes
at the University of Michigan. The average age of these participants was 18.84 years
(range= 18–22). They were given course credit for their participation in the study.
Twenty-six older adults (mean age= 69.8 years, range= 62–79) were recruited
from the greater Ann Arbor, MI, area and were paid $25 for their participation. All
participants had to respond to stimuli that were related to the domain of morality
and competence. In addition, within each domain the information included both
positive and negative person cues, as done in Experiment 1. Thus, the design of
the study was a 2 (Age Group; older adults, younger adults)× 2 (Person cue do-
main; morality, competence)× 2 (Cue valence; positive, negative) mixed design,
with the first factor varying between participants and the latter two factors vary-
ing within participants. Participants were run in same-age, noninteracting groups
of 2–4.
Materials and Procedure
In order to examine the word frequency explanation for the findings obtained
by Wentura et al. (2000), we created a new stimulus list so that word valence
covaried with frequency, as it does naturally, in an effort to mimic the conditions of
Wentura et al. Forty person cues (words) and 40 nonwords were used in this study.
Half of the items were related to morality and half were related to competence.
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In addition, half of the items were positive in valence and half were negative in
valence. The negative items on average had a frequency of occurrence ofM = 7.85
per million (negative moral= 6.80; negative competence= 8.90). On the other
hand, the positive items had a frequency of occurrence ofM = 36.60 per million
(positive moral= 31.30; positive competence= 41.90). The word frequencies
were submitted to a 2 (Person cue domain; morality, competence)×2 (Cue valence;
positive, negative) repeated measures ANOVA. The analysis produced the main
effect for valence as expected,F(1, 36)= 6.27, p < .01, but no other effects were
reliable. Thus, the analysis confirmed that only the person cue’s valence covaried
with word frequency.
The remaining aspects of the procedure were the same as those used in Ex-
periment 1, except that participants responded to the stimuli twice in two separate
blocks. After completing their responses to the two blocks of items, participants
were debriefed, given course credit or paid, and thanked for their participation.
Results
Wrong responses occurred at a low rate (1.47%; younger= 1.88%, older=
1.06%), so they were not analyzed. In addition, responses beyond 2 s were classified
as outliers and removed from the analysis. The outliers constituted less than 1%
of all responses (younger= .19%, older= 1.2%). The analysis was equivalent
whether these responses were included or not.
The effect of word frequency on the speed with which people process words
is not linear; there is a marginal decrease in reaction time per unit of increase
in word frequency (Balota & Chumbley, 1984; Gordon & Caramazza, 1982). In
order to control for this bias, we adjusted participants’ response latencies for each
item by multiplying it by the log of the word’s frequency of occurrence in the
Kucera and Francis (1967) norms. This technique corresponds to that used by
other researchers who have examined the effects of word frequency on a vari-
ety of cognitive processes, including assessments of visual duration (Howes &
Solomon, 1951), spelling errors (Bricker, Schuell, & Jenkins, 1964), object recog-
nition (Milianti & Cullinan, 1974), and lexical decisions (Balota & Chumbley,
1984; Gordon & Caramazza, 1982; Schilling et al., 1998). Then, as done in Ex-
periment 1, we created four average response latencies for each participant, repre-
senting their responses to the positive and negative person cues from the morality
and competence domains. Participants’adjustedresponse latencies to the person
cues were submitted to a 2 (Age Group; older adults, younger adults)× 2 (Person
cue domain; morality, competence)× 2 (Cue valence; positive, negative) mixed
design ANOVA, with the first factor varying between participants and the latter two
factors varying within participants (see Table II for means). As expected, younger
adults (M = 513) responded faster to the cues than the older adults (M = 704),
F(1, 50)= 28.18, p < .0001.
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Table II. Mean Adjusted Response Times (Response Time× Log(Frequency)) as









Note.The larger the number the longer the response time.
Of greater interest, the findings replicated Experiment 1. The analysis yielded
a main effect for domain,F(1, 50)= 82.18, p < .0001, which indicated that
participants responded faster to morality (M = 551) than competence-related
person cues (M = 667). The analysis also produced a main effect for valence,
F(1, 50)= 314.24, p < .0001. This effect indicated that participants were faster
to respond to negative (M = 471) than positive person cues (M = 746). Finally, the
interaction of domain and valence was also reliableF(1, 50)= 5.92,p < .02. Simi-
lar to Experiment 1, this effect indicated that the difference in responding to the neg-
ative versus positive cues was larger in the morality domain (Mdifference= 303)
than the competence domain (Mdifference= 246).
In terms of the hypothesis that all people would be most sensitive to immoral-
ity cues than to any other type of cue, people’s responses to the immorality cues
were compared to each of the other three types of cues. All of the comparisons
were reliable (ps< .0001). People were fastest to recognize person cues that were
related to immoral dispositions than any other type of disposition.
With regard to the responses of the younger and older adults, the analysis
revealed no age interactions (Fs< 1.00). Thus, despite the general difference in
response times between the younger and the older adults, participants from both
age groups responded to the different person cues in the same manner.
We conducted a second analysis of the data uncorrected for word frequency.
This mimics the analysis of Wentura et al. (2000) who found that people responded
faster to positive compared with negative words. Participants’unadjustedresponse
latencies were submitted to a 2 (Age Group; older adults, younger adults)× 2 (Per-
son cue domain; morality, competence)×2 (Cue valence; positive, negative) mixed
design ANOVA, with the first factor varying between participants and the latter two
factors varying within participants. The analysis produced a main effect for valence,
F(1, 50)= 36.28, p < .0001, which in this case showed that people responded
fastest to the positive (M = 620 ms) than negative words (M = 701 ms), just as
Wentura et al. found. Despite the change in the results with respect to valence,
the analysis still showed that people responded fastest to morality person cues
(M = 645 ms) than to competence person cues (M = 676 ms),F(1, 50)= 7.05,
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p < .01. The analysis also produced an interaction of Age and Cue valence,
F(1, 50)= 12.11, p < .001. This effect indicated that the difference in the re-
sponses of the younger and older adults was greater for negative person cues
(M = 264 ms) than for positive person cues (M = 171 ms). No other effects were
reliable.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present studies have shown that people have a greater sensitivity to person
information (traits) from the morality domain than the competence domain. This
effect was strongest in people’s responses to person cues that signal immorality.
These effects were obtained using two different procedures, one in which word
frequency was experimentally controlled (Experiment 1) and one in which word
frequency was statistically controlled (Experiment 2). Despite the overall slower
responses of the older participants in recognizing the person cues, consistent with
much research in cognitive aging, the results indicated that responses to the person
cues were age-invariant. Finally, the findings indicated that word frequency can
play a role in determining people’s responses to words (see Balota & Chumbley,
1984; Schilling et al., 1998), so that if word frequency is not taken into account
experimentally or statistically, the word frequency effect will mask the real con-
tribution of a person cue’s informativeness.
The present results suggest that people evidence a life-long concern with
others’ morality. This is likely due to their interest in determining costs and threats
(cf. Pratto & John, 1991), as person information from the morality domain tends to
signal negative personal characteristics, whereas person information in the com-
petence domain tends to signal positive personal characteristics (cf. Reeder &
Brewer, 1979; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987). Consistent with this interpretation,
the findings from both studies showed that participants were fastest in responding
to immorality cues than to any other type of person cue.
This greater sensitivity to immorality cues than to other types of cues is
consistent with research findings on automatic vigilance (Pratto & John, 1991).
Pratto and John (1991, Experiment 2) used a stroop task to test their hypothesis.
In a typical stroop experiment, participants are presented with words in different
colors, and the main task for participants is to name the color in which the word
is printed. However, attending to the meaning of the word can lead to interfer-
ence in processing if the word itself refers to a color. Pratto and John used this
reasoning to examine the degree to which the evaluativeness of stimuli that dif-
fered in valence could capture attentional resources and interfere with the color-
naming task. Because of the more automatic evaluation of negative compared with
positive words, people took longer to respond to negative than positive words in a
Stroop task.
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Although the findings of the present studies are based on facilitation rather
than inhibitory effects, the underlying reasoning is similar to that underlying the
notion of automatic vigilance—certain stimuli grab people’s attention. The present
findings would suggest, however, that inhibitory effects would also depend on the
domain of person information participants are asked to respond to. Given that in
the present research participants responded fastest to immorality cues than to other
types of cues, it might be that in a stroop task such cues would create the greatest
disruption (cf. Wentura et al., 2000).
It is also important to point out the finding showing that younger and older
adults differed little in their responses to cues from the morality domain, as well
as the competence domain. These findings support the idea that people’s sensitiv-
ity (chronic concern) to cues about others’ morality, especially their immorality,
remains stable over the life-course. Moreover, older adults show less sensitivity to
competence than morality, the same pattern evidenced by young adults. Thus, it
appears that the value placed on both morality and competence is invariant across
the lifespan. The notion that older people are less concerned about competence in
others than are young adults is not validated by this study. Although longitudinal
data would provide a better test of this conclusion, the findings nevertheless are
consistent with the perspective that although certain life goals change as a person
grows older (Carstensen et al., 1997), all people remain embedded in a web of
social relations where both morality and competence are important.
The present analysis at some level provides a characterization of the perceiver
as slightly paranoid. But is such wariness warranted? It is interesting to point out
that social systems can tolerate only a small amount of deception (Boehm, 1997;
Dawkins & Krebs, 1978; Zahavi, 1993). Otherwise, social life would be chaotic. In
addition, under many circumstances there is a tendency for fairness and coopera-
tion to evolve in social systems (Skyrms, 1996). Consequently, in many functional
social systems, the degree to which people should be watching out for others in
actuality should be small. The present findings, along with many others in social
cognition demonstrating negativity effects (see Ybarra, 2001, for a review), sug-
gest that people’s minds (that is, some component of the mind) may be poised to
recognize and select threatening social stimuli from the environment. Such a set
of responses may not necessarily be learned but may be built into the architec-
ture of the mind (cf. Atran, 1988; Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992; Sperber,
1996).
In conclusion, people regardless of age are particularly sensitive to cues that
have to do with others’ morality rather than their competence. In addition, people’s
sensitivity to person cues from the morality domain, especially cues that suggest
immorality, may tend to remain relatively stable over a person’s life-course. These
findings may reflect the value all people place in knowing whether or not others
are immoral and will pose threats. This pattern of sensitivities suggests that when
people attempt to make sense of others, constraints are in place that make such a
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cognitively demanding task possible to accomplish, although potentially inclining
people to judge others negatively.
REFERENCES
Anderson, N. H. (1968). Likableness ratings of 555 personality-trait words.Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 9, 272–279.
Antonucci, T. C., & Akiyama, H. (1987). An examination of sex differences in social support in mid
and late life.Sex Roles, 17,737–749.
Asch, S. E. (1946). Forming impressions of personality.Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,
41,1230–1240.
Asch, S. E. (1952).Social psychology. NY: Prentice-Hall.
Atran, S. (1988). Basic conceptual domains.Mind and Language, 3, 7–16.
Bales, R. F. (1953). The equilibrium problem in small groups. In T. Parsons, R. F. Bales, & E. A. Shils
(Eds.),Working papers in the theory of action. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
Bales, R. F. (1965). The equilibrium problem. In A. P. Hare, E. F. Borgatta, & R. F. Bales (Eds.),Small
groups: Studies in social interaction(pp. 437–447). New York: Knopf.
Balota, D. A., & Chumbley, J. I. (1984). Are lexical decisions a good measure of lexical access? The
role of word frequency in the neglected decision stage.Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Human Perception and Performance, 10,340–357.
Bargh, J. A., Chaiken, S., Govender, R., & Pratto, F. (1992). The generality of the automatic attitude
activation effect.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62,893–912.
Barkow, J. H., Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1992).The adapted mind: Evolutionary psychology and the
generation of culture. New York: Oxford University Press.
Benet, V., & Waller, N. G. (1995). The big seven factor model of personality description. Evidence for
its cross-cultural generality in a Spanish sample.Journal of Personality, 69,701–718.
Benne, K. D., & Sheats, P. (1948). Functional roles of group members.Journal of Social Issues, 4,
41–49.
Boehm, C. (1997). Egalitarian behavior and the evolution of political intelligence. In A. Whiten & R. W.
Byrne (Eds.),Machiavellian intelligence II(pp. 341–364). Cambridge: Cambridge university
Press.
Bricker, A. L., Schuell, H., & Jenkins, J. J. (1964). Effect of word frequency and word length on aphasic
spelling errors.Journal of Speech and Hearing Research, 7, 183–192.
Bruner, J. S. (1957). On perceptual readiness.P ychological Review, 64,123–152.
Carstensen, L. L., Gross, J., & Fung, H. (1997). The social context of emotion.Annual review of
geriatrics and gerontology, 17,325–352.
Charles, S. T., & Carstensen, L. L. (1999). The role of time in the setting of social goals across the
lifespan. In T. M. Hess & F. Blanchard-Fields, (Eds.),Social cognition and aging(pp. 319–342).
San Diego: Academic Press.
Coser, L. (1956).The functions of social conflict. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
Craik, F. I. M., & Byrd, M. (1982). Aging and cognitive deficits: The role of attentional resources.
In F. I. M. Craik & S. Trehub (Eds.),Aging and cognitive processes(pp. 191–211). New York:
Plenum Press.
Dawkins, R., & Krebs, J. R. (1978). Animal signals: Information or manipulation. In J. R. Krebs & N. B.
Davies (Eds.),Behavioral ecology: An evolutionary approach(pp. 282–309). Oxford: Blackwell.
Fiedler, F. E., & Chemers, M. M. (1974).Leadership and effective management. Glenview, IL: Scott,
Foresman.
Frieske, D. A., & Park, D. C. (1999). Memory for news in young and old adults.Psychology and Aging,
14,90–98.
Gordon, B., & Caramazza, A. (1982). Lexical decision for open- and closed-class words: Failure to
replicate differential frequency sensitivity.Brain and Language, 15,143–160.
Hamner, W. C., & Organ, D. W. (1978).Organizational behavior: An applied psychological approach.
Dallas, TX: Business publications.
P1: GVG/GFQ/GIR P2: GCP/GCR
Motivation and Emotion [me] PP231-343706 August 3, 2001 13:46 Style file version Nov. 19th, 1999
Immorality Monitoring 99
Heider, F. (1944). Social perception and phenomenal causality.Psychological Review, 51,358–374.
Higgins, E. T. (1996). Knowledge activation: Accessibility, applicability, and salience. In A. W.
Kruglanski and E. T. Higgins (Eds.),Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles(pp. 133–
168). New York: The Guilford Press.
Howes, D. H., & Solomon, R. L. (1951). Visual duration threshold as a function of word-probability.
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 41,401–410.
Jones, E. E., & Gerard, H. B. (1967).Foundations of social psychology. New York: Wiley.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk.Economet-
rica, 47,263–291.
Kucera, H., & Francis, W. N. (1967).Computational analysis of present-day American English. Prov-
idence: Brown University Press.
Lee, D. J., & Markides, K. S. (1990). Activity and mortality among aged persons over an eight-year
period.The Journals of Gerontology: Social Sciences, 45,39–42.
Meyer, D. E., & Schvaneveldt, R. W. (1971). Facilitation in recognizing pairs of words: Evidence of a
dependence between retrieval operations.Journal of Experimental Psychology, 90,227–234.
Milianti, F. J., & Cullinan, W. L. (1974). Effects of age and word frequency on object recognition and
naming in children.Journal of Speech and Hearing Research, 17, 373–385.
Morrell, R., & Park, D. C. (1993). Effects of age, illustrations and task variables on the performance
of procedural assembly tasks.Psychology and Aging, 8, 389–399.
Park, D. C. (2000). The basic mechanisms accounting for age-related decline in cognitive function.
In D. C. Park & N. Schwarz (Eds.),Cognitive aging: A primer(pp. 3–22). Philadelphia, PA:
Psychology Press.
Park, D. C., Davidson, N., Lautenschlager, G., Smith, A. D., Smith, P., & Hedden, T. (2000). Models of
visuospatial and verbal memory across the adult life span. (Manuscript under review, University
of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI).
Park, D. C., Smith, A. D., Lautenschlager, G., Earles, J., Frieske, D., Zwahr, M., & Gaines, C. (1996).
Mediators of long-term memory performance across the life span.Psychology and Aging, 11,
621–637.
Peeters, G., & Czapinski, J. (1990). Positive-negative asymmetry in evaluations: The distinction be-
tween affective and informational negativity effects.European Review of Social Psychology, 1,
33–60.
Pratto, F., & John, O. P. (1991). Automatic vigilance: The attention-grabbing power of negative social
information.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61,380–391.
Reeder, G. D., & Brewer, M. B. (1979). A schematic model of dispositional attribution in interpersonal
perception.Psychological Review, 86,61–79.
Rosenberg, S., Nelson, C., & Vivekananthan, P. S. (1968). A multi-dimensional approach to the structure
of personality impressions.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 9, 283–294.
Salthouse, T. A. (1991).Theoretical perspectives on cognitive aging. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Salthouse, T. A. (1996). The processing-speed theory of adult age differences in cognition.Psycholog-
ical Review, 103,403–428.
Sanchez-Burks, J., Nisbett, R. E., & Ybarra, O. (2000). Relational schemas, cultural styles and prejudice
against outgroups.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79,179–181.
Schilling, H. E. H., Rayner, K., & Chumbley, J. (1998). Comparing naming. Lexical decision, and eye
fixation times: Word frequency effects and individual differences.Memory and Cognition, 26,
1271–1281.
Shartle, C. L. (1956).Executive performance and leadership. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Skowronski, J. J., & Carlston, D. E. (1987). Social judgment and social memory: The role of cue
diagnosticity in negativity, positivity, and extremity biases.Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 52,689–699.
Skyrms, B. (1996).Evolution of the social contract. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Sperber, D. (1996).Explaining culture: A naturalistic approach. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
Tagiuri, R., & Petrullo, L. (1958).Person perception and interpersonal behavior. Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press.
Wentura, D., Rothermund, K., & Bak, P. (2000). Automatic vigilance: The attention-grabbing power of
approach and avoidance-related social information.J urnal of Personality and Social Psychology,
78,1024–1037.
P1: GVG/GFQ/GIR P2: GCP/GCR
Motivation and Emotion [me] PP231-343706 August 3, 2001 13:46 Style file version Nov. 19th, 1999
100 Ybarra, Chan, and Park
Wojciszke, B. (1997). Parallels between competence-versus morality-related traits and individualistic
versus collectivistic values.European Journal of Social Psychology, 27,245–256.
Ybarra, O. (2001).People’s naive causal understanding of valenced behaviors and its implications
for social information processing. Manuscript submitted for publication, University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor, MI.
Ybarra, O., & Stephan, W. G. (1996). Misanthropic person memory.J urnal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 70,691–700.
Ybarra, O., & Stephan, W. G. (1999). Attributional orientations and the prediction of behavior: The
attribution-prediction bias.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76,718–727.
Zahavi, A. (1993). The fallacy of conventional signaling.Proceedings of the Royal Society of London,
340,227–230.
Zwahr, M. D., Park, D. C., & Shifren, K. (1999). Judgments about estrogen replacement therapy: The
role of age, cognitive abilities and beliefs.Psychology and Aging, 14,179–191.
